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Abstract
The introduction of a liberal media model built on freedom of expression, non-regulation, 
and free market in Post-Communist Mongolia has lead to a plethora of new media outlets. 
In a context of external pluralism, the media are key players in dramatic political, social, and 
cultural changes in Mongolian society. However, due to violations of media freedom, lack 
of ethical standards as well as market failures in a media market marred with clientelism, 
the Mongolian media have neither lived up to the ideals of liberal media theory nor been 
driving forces in the ongoing democratization process. Instead, private and public media, 
in an unholy alliance, appear more like a lapdog in the service of the political and financial 
establishment than like a watchdog.
Keywords: Mongolia, post-communism, liberal media theory, democratization, media free-
dom, and media institutions
Introduction
In many Post-Communist countries, as is the case in Mongolia, the media systems have 
changed dramatically from a totalitarian media system rigorously controlled by the state 
and the party to different forms of more or less liberal media systems supplemented 
with public broadcasting. These changes in the media landscapes are an integrated part 
of fundamental political, social, and cultural changes in the transition countries. The 
media’s role in the transition processes and specifically their role in the ongoing democ-
ratization processes are both theoretically and empirically complex issues that can only 
be understood in a historical context. The main aim of the present article is to analyze the 
introduction of a Western-inspired liberal media model in Mongolia, focusing on both an 
analysis of the media system in respect to media supply, ownership, and market situation 
and an analysis of violations of freedom of expression and challenges to journalistic 
integrity. Secondly, the aim is more generally to shed some light on central aspects of 
the media’s role in democratization processes in Post-Communist countries. 
Media and Society in Post-Communist Countries
Ever since the appearance of mass media, the relation between media and society has been 
contested. In 1956, Siebert et al., in Four Theories of the Press, presented the thesis “that 
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the press always takes on the form and coloration of the social and political structures 
within which it operates” (p. 1-2). From an overall perspective, this thesis might to some 
extent be correct – totalitarian media systems dominated in most Communist countries 
as did different forms of liberal media systems in Western democracies – but if we take a 
closer look at the former Communist media systems in Yugoslavia, Romania, and Mon-
golia, it is striking that despite the similarities they were quite different, just as the media 
systems in Germany, Holland and Denmark always have had similarities and differences. 
In general, the relation between media and society is dynamic and takes place in a complex 
interplay of political, financial, social, and cultural factors operating on local, national, and 
international levels. This is not least the case in relation to media in many Post-Communist 
countries, where first an often tumultuous transition process has been followed by a con-
solidation phase in which the media have been a battlefield between different political 
and financial interests, resulting in widely different media systems in widely different 
Post-Communist societies with respect to democratization and modernization. 
In Mongolia, like in many other Post-Communist countries, the media system has 
been headed toward a Western liberal model fundamentally inspired by liberal media 
theory and built on freedom of expression, non-regulation, and the free market. The 
primary idea behind liberal media theory is that the free market and freedom of expres-
sion almost by default will create free and independent media, and the media will fulfill 
their principal democratic role to act as a watchdog over the state. Taking its point of 
departure in an analysis of the introduction of a liberal media model in Post-Communist 
Mongolia, the aim of the present article is to discuss the complex relation between media 
and society in Post-Communist countries, focusing on the media’s democratic role.
Mongolia has been chosen as the case study for several reasons: First of all, Mongolia 
is in the midst of a comprehensive and partly successful democratization process. The 
Mongolian constitution adopted in 1992 introduced a representative democracy with a 
market economy. Mongolia has conducted regular, fairly free multi-party national and 
local elections since 1990. The elections have resulted in alterations in governing power, 
which from a theoretical point of view is considered a healthy sign in a consolidating 
democracy. Secondly, Mongolian media legislation guarantees freedom of expression, 
freedom of the press, and freedom to seek and receive information. The media legislation 
supports a liberal media system with a plurality of private print and electronic media 
supplemented with public broadcasting. Thirdly, the Mongolian media landscape is quite 
well documented with respect to media supply and to some extent with respect to media 
use, content and ownership1.
Finally, many of the typical political, professional, and financial problems related 
to the introduction of free media appear to be present in the Mongolian context and 
therefore accessible for analysis and theoretical reflections.
It is important to stress that the media in Mongolia do not only play a role from a 
democratization perspective. The media have a profound impact on the radical social 
and cultural changes that Mongolia is experiencing as part of the thorough moderniza-
tion process. However, the modernizations process will only briefly be addressed here, 
although it is closely related to the democratization process. 
Further, the article focuses primarily on the current media development in Mongolia. 
The pre-transition and transition phase will only be presented briefly to better understand 
the current development2.
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The Transition from Communism
Mongolia was the second state in the World that turned to Communism back in 1921, 
and although formally independent, Mongolia was a Soviet vassal state geopolitically 
sandwiched between the Soviet Union and China. During Communism, the totalitarian 
regime controlled all national and local media rigorously, and after 1970, the only foreign 
television available in Mongolia was a retransmission of the Soviet television station Orbit. 
Censorship was common, and journalists who challenged the official policy were punished 
severely. Owing to a Mongolian version of ‘Perestroika’, the regime loosened its grip and 
gave state- and party-run media more editorial freedom in the late 1980s. In any event, the 
Mongolian media were loyal to the regime and did not play any significant role in creating 
an environment for the non-violent Mongolian transition in 1990. The transition was non-
dramatic and primarily spurred by the collapse of the Soviet Union in the late 1980s; the 
slightly reformed Communist party, Mongolian People’s Revolutionary Party (MPRP), 
stayed in power after the first two multi-party elections in 1990 and 1992.
The independent newspaper Shine Toly broke the government monopoly in February 
1990, and within two years a wide variety of mainly weekly political newspapers mush-
roomed. Many Mongolians exploited enthusiastically the newfound freedom to express 
themselves, but despite this enthusiasm and the constitutional rights ensured in 1992, 
the new print publications had to overcome a series of severe obstacles, including an 
economic crisis from 1992 to 1994, and unfair competition from the government with 
regard to access to newsprint, printing, and distribution. Many newly established news-
papers were published irregularly, and the state-run newspapers managed to maintain a 
dominant position in terms of circulation throughout the 1990s. Further, MPRP control-
led all electronic media until 1994, when AMONG, a Christian American-Mongolian 
foundation, launched Eagle TV in Ulaanbataar. In 1996 and 1997, two more stations 
were launched in the capital. 
Despite the dominant control of the media, MPRP was not able to stay in power. The 
party lost the presidential election in 1993 as well as the parliamentary election in 1996, 
partly due to the above-mentioned economic crisis. It would seem, then, that controlling 
the media does not necessarily ensure political control: The relation between the media 
and politics is more complex.
Since the transition, Mongolian society has undergone dramatic political, social, and 
cultural changes. During communism, a beginning urbanization of the predominantly no-
madic Mongolian society took place, and this process has intensified after the transition. 
The current Mongolian society is socially and culturally divided between the capital and 
the sparsely populated vast rural areas (1.6 million square kilometers). The Mongolian 
population is around 2.5 million: one third lives in the capital, one third lives in aimag 
and soum center3, and the final one third consists of herders. 
The capital has undergone a significant modernization process with financial prosper-
ity, where a newly affluent upper-middle class has access to new modern apartments, 
cars, and other kinds of expensive consumer goods. However, there are huge social 
inequalities, and the majority of people in the capital only have access to cheap, often 
second class, imported consumer goods from China, and many people live on bare mini-
mum in traditional gers and shacks in the outskirts of Ulaanbataar. In Ulaanbataar, there 
is widespread access to television, radio and print media, mobile phones are common, 
and Internet access has increased.
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The stagnant rural areas are likewise culturally and socially divided between herd-
ers living a traditional nomadic lifestyle in gers and people living in the often, dreary 
towns and villages with a mixture of Soviet style apartment buildings, shacks and gers. 
The herders are highly dependent on their livestock. In 2000 and 2001, devastating cold 
winters caused heavy losses of livestock, but since then most herders have regained 
their losses and many herders now have huge livestock of sheep, goats, horses, camels 
and yaks. Except for a few mining areas and slowly developing tourism, the towns are 
dependent on husbandry and trade, and there is little prosperity in these towns. The in-
frastructure in the rural areas is dismal, concerning both roads and power (most villages 
only have diesel power a few hours per day) and health care and education. In fact health 
care and education have deteriorated significantly since the fall of Communism, although 
the literacy rate is still very high at around 97%. The towns have access to redistributed 
national television, national radio, local radio and television, and print media. The 
herders have access to terrestrial national radio and irregularly distributed print media. 
Further, it is estimated that between one third and half of herders have access to satellite 
television, often using solar panels or windmills as their source of power.
Politically, the elections have resulted in dramatic shifts in the governing power, and 
after the election in 2004, an unforeseen coalition government between the MPRP and 
the Democratic Party (DP) was formed. Although alterations in governing power and a 
plurality of media can be seen as healthy signs in a consolidating democracy, the demo-
cratic process in Mongolia is prone to serious problems such as corruption, violations 
of human rights, no distinct differentiation between legislative, executive, and judicial 
powers, and confusion between political and business interests. 
Corruption
Corruption is a huge problem for Mongolian society on the whole. In 2005, the United 
States Agency for International Development (USAID) published a report on corruption 
that concluded:
The major finding of the report, consistent with other quantitative and qualitative 
studies conducted previously, is that opportunities for corruption are increasing in 
Mongolia at both the “petty” or administrative and “grand” or elite levels. Both 
types of corruption should be of concern to Mongolians, but grand corruption 
should be considered a more serious one because it solidifies linkages between 
economic and political power that can negatively impact or ultimately derail de-
mocracy and development, as it has in other post-Communist countries. (Casals 
& Associates 2005 p. 1)
The ‘grand’ corruption is related to many different areas: natural resources, privati-
zation, development aid, customs duties, taxation, the legal sector, and allocation of 
land use licenses. In many cases, the stakes are high and there are often conflicts of 
interest between political and financial interests. “The team heard over and over again 
that economic and political elites are, if not one and the same, then certainly operat-
ing in close cooperation with each other for mutual benefit. The line between public 
and private spheres is almost non-existent, and COI [Conflict Of Interest] is rampant, 
particularly at the highest levels of the economy and polity.” (op. cit. p. 4). The grand 
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corruption establishes a system of comprehensive clientelism, in which the political 
and financial establishment rule through personal connections instead of by following 
formal regulations. 
 ‘Petty’ corruption is rampant, from traffic police taking bribes instead of handing 
out speeding tickets to tax authorities favoring relatives. ‘Petty’ corruption is widely 
accepted and is often excused by the low salary of government employees or seen as 
part of tight family ties.
A contributing factor to the increasing corruption is “A lack of transparency and ac-
cess to information that surrounds many government functions and undermines nearly 
all aspects of accountability by contributing to an ineffective media and hindering citizen 
participation in policy discussions and government oversight” (op. cit. p. 1). Despite 
the guarantees in the Mongolian constitution regarding the freedom to seek and receive 
information, the main legal infringement on free media is related to lack of access to 
information. The state secrecy law allows comprehensive secrecy classifications to be 
applied to government records, so in this respect the current legislation does not fulfill 
international standards for freedom of information, the result being that government of-
ficials at all levels make frequent use of these restrictions to keep information secret. 
Media Market with Market Failures
The Mongolian media system is guided by liberal media theory based on freedom of the 
press and free market. There are no restrictions on ownership or regulations on competi-
tion besides the general competition law, and thus far the competition law has not been 
used in relation to the media. Anyhow, the free media market has revealed some serious 
shortcomings in respect to free and independent media. 
The current number of print and electronic media outlets in Mongolia is impressive, 
especially considering the relatively small population. 
Figure 1. Mongolian Media 20064
Newspapers 147
Dailies 10
Biweeklies 5
Weeklies 24
Bimonthly 70
Others 38
Of which local newspapers 36
Magazines 84
Television stations 50
National 1 5
Ulaanbataar 16
Local 33
Radio stations 63
National 1
Ulaanbataar 20
Local 42
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In 2006, 147 newspapers were published, of which 10 were dailies. This impressive 
number indicates a thriving print market with respect to pluralism and freedom of the 
press, but with respect to circulation and the quality of the print media, it is a different 
story. The total circulation of the ten daily newspapers is estimated to be around 52,000, 
and the three largest newspapers in terms of circulation Udriin Sonin (13,700), Zuunye 
Medee (8,500) and Unuudur (8,000 in 2005) take the lion’s share. Four recently estab-
lished newspapers in 2005 and 2006 only have circulation figures between 1,000 and 
5,300. Some of the weekly tabloids have significant circulation, with Seuruleg being the 
largest with 47,500, followed by Khumuus with 42,000, and three others between 10,000 
and 20,000. The rest of the newspapers and all the magazines have limited circulation. 
There is no transparency regarding revenue in the print media. The moderate circula-
tion indicates that, with a few exceptions, revenue from sales and advertisement is quite 
low. Although the newspapers in some cases have significant revenue from ‘paid for’ 
stories, only a few of the daily newspapers and some weeklies could be profitable and 
run as media businesses on their own. In general, the print media are supported finan-
cially by business and/or political interests, and the print media are not determined by 
market principles, but governed by the economic and political interests of the owners 
and beneficiaries. The aim is less to inform the public and more to influence political 
and financial decision-makers.
If we look at the electronic media, the plethora of stations is amazing, but again only 
a few stations are financially viable. After the introduction of four private television 
stations in the mid- and late 1990s, the television market in Ulaanbataar was quite stable 
for some years, until two new high-profile stations were established in 2003, and ever 
since that time, the television sector has been in the midst of dynamic changes both 
in the capital and locally. During the past three years, additionally 6 terrestrial and 10 
cable-fed Mongolian channels have been launched in Ulaanbataar. The initial private 
stations and some of the new terrestrial channels are high-profile and well-funded sta-
tions, while most of the cable-fed channels are low-budget stations operated by some of 
the Cable TV systems available in Ulaanbaatar6. Besides the many television stations, 
there are 20 private FM stations in Ulaanbataar. 
The lack of financial transparency makes it impossible to acquire any detailed knowl-
edge about the financial situation in the electronic media. In any case, the limited, 
although increasing, advertisement market cannot sustain 16 television stations and 20 
radio stations in the capital. Even the most popular and high-profile television stations 
seem to rely on financial subsidies from political and business interests, and it is symp-
tomatic that the stations do not follow professional standards to optimize advertisement 
revenue, although some stations are slowly focusing more on market opportunities, 
and audience research has recently gained momentum. While the print media narrowly 
address decision-makers, the main aim of the politically biased high-profile television 
stations is to influence the general public.
In local media in the provinces the financial situation is even worse, advertisement 
revenue is minimal and there are no signs of an emerging, local advertising market. The 
circulation of local weekly or biweekly newspapers is usually around 200 and rarely 
exceeds 500, so revenue is limited. Easy access to licenses and inexpensive hardware 
have made it possible to launch local radio stations for US$ 5000, and in 2006, the 
output of local electronic media had increased to 33 radio and 44 television stations. A 
25
few low-budget youth-oriented ‘bedroom’ FM stations dominated by music and phone-
in announcements have temporarily been able to do reasonable business, but in general 
local media are strongly dependent on subsidies from local government or political and 
business interests.
In theory, the Mongolian media market is non-regulated and follows market princi-
ples, but in reality the media market has market failures, because the media system has 
detached itself from market principles. These market failures are caused by the size of 
the market, an immature market, limited advertisement revenue, and first and foremost 
vested financial and political interests in a society based on corruption and clientelism. 
The market failures reveal shortcomings in liberal media theory, because the theory has 
strong faith in the robustness of market principles and takes for granted that the media 
will act as rational media businesses and by default play by market principles. Private 
Mongolian media are not determined by market principles, because the Mongo lian me-
dia provide a commodity that is different from other commodities. The private media 
provide political and financial influence for their owners and beneficiaries.
It can be argued that small fragments of the Mongolian media market operate as media 
businesses following market principles. The mushrooming of private low-budget local 
FM stations reveals that there are local entrepreneurs that want to run stations as busi-
nesses, but despite sincere aspirations to provide a variety of quality programs including 
local news, in reality the stations cannot afford to invest in genuine local programming 
and they end up mainly providing pirated popular music and announcements anchored 
by high school youth. Further, a few of the weekly tabloids make a profit, because they 
have been able to expand the popularity of the tabloids to social groups that rarely read 
the traditional political newspapers and even reach people living in the countryside. 
However, the tabloids are known for inaccurate and slanderous reporting, which demon-
strates that popularity does not necessarily promote relevant information and journalistic 
quality. Not even these fragments of the media market governed by market principles 
fulfill the normative role of liberal media theory. 
Media Ownership
Regarding media ownership, access to reliable information is limited, and it is often 
impossible to identify the actual owners of the media outlets. However, it is possible to 
identify political parallelism with close connections between media outlets and political 
parties, just as politicians and big businesses often jointly invest in media outlets.
The largest daily newspaper, Udryn Sonin, is owned by a company supporting the 
Democratic Party. The ownership of the second largest, Zunie Medee, is not disclosed, 
but consistent rumors maintain that the wife of the President is one of the owners. The 
third largest, Unuudor, is owned by Mongol News – one of the most powerful media 
groups in Mongolia. The group also owns three minor weekly newspapers, the television 
station MN Channel 25, and a distribution company. The group is thought to be aligned 
toward a faction of MPRP. MPRP also runs a party newspaper, Unen. The Municipality 
of Ulaanbaatar owns Ulaanbaatar Times, two television stations, and a radio station, 
although the media law of 1998 prohibits government-run media. With respect to the 
four newly established minor daily newspapers, one is privately owned and supports 
the President, another is privately owned and affiliated with MPRP, while the last two 
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are said to be backed by business interests. The private company Tayankhan owns the 
tabloid Seruuleg as well as the television station, TV8, a radio station, and a minor 
newspaper. Most of the many small weekly and bimonthly newspapers are politically 
motivated and often owned by the editor.
The privately owned television stations are operated with various degrees of politi-
cal and business interests behind the stations. The programming policies of TV5 and 
TV9 indicate clearly that the stations are aligned with MPRP. Formally, Media Holding 
owns TV9, but persistent reports maintain that the President owns the channel. Formally, 
private investors own TV5, but reports are that the station maintains close relationships 
with top politicians in MPRP and a mining company. A newly established and heavily 
funded TV station, C1, belongs to the private company Genco Group, whose president 
is a member of parliament for the DP. The American religious Among Foundation owns 
Eagle TV. Besides promoting Christian values, Among Foundation is aligned with the 
far right in American policy. Eagle TV is heavily supported from the US. The Chinese 
cable operator Sansar CATV owns three of the newly established cable-fed channels. 
In the countryside, several of the old local media are either formally owned or indi-
rectly controlled by the local governments. Many recently established television stations 
are owned by local businessmen, often with connections to a politician or a political 
party. Before the election in 2004, MPRP launched many local FM stations as political 
vehicles, but after the elections MPRP often suspended the financial support and the sta-
tions were left to sink or swim with new self-declared independent managers. However, 
the original owner still holds the license, and only the next elections will show the true 
level of independence.
There is no legislation on ownership concentration, neither regarding control of one 
market, e.g. print, nor regarding cross-ownership and foreign ownership. However, 
concentration of media ownership is not an issue in respect to media conglomerates. 
Monitoring Mongolian Media 2006 identified 31 media owners that own more than 
one media outlet, but none of these multiple media owners are really dominant play-
ers, so from a financial point of view, current media ownership is not a threat to media 
pluralism. Neither is foreign ownership an issue, although foreign ownership of media 
exists in practice as exemplified through Eagle TV and Sansar CATV. However, there 
are tendencies toward increased ownership concentration around a few key political 
figures closely related to large businesses. This problem is less a question of media 
concentration and lack of pluralism, and more a question of conflicts of interest and a 
system governed by clientelism. 
Violations of Media Freedom
As pointed out, the overall Mongolian legal framework is quite progressive with respect 
to freedom of expression and freedom of the press7. However, in the Mongolian media 
experience, continuously different forms of violations of media freedom and political 
and financial pressure on the media are prevalent.
In October 2005, a local NGO, Globe International, in association with the Inter-
national Free Expression eXchange (IFEX) and Moscow-based Center for Journalists 
for Extreme Situation began the project Monitoring free expression violations and 
Supporting the rights of independent media in Mongolia. The goal of the project is to 
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monitor violations of media freedom and to campaign for the rights of independent 
media. Within the first year, 35 violations have been reported to Globe International8. 
The monitoring project has identified violations of freedom of expression in many dif-
ferent forms ranging from physical harassment and death threats, extensive use of libel 
cases, to denial of information and unjustified obstructions. The violations take place 
in national as well as local media.
The alerts include a television journalist beaten by unidentified perpetrators. In June 
2006, she reported in Forbidden to watch on a local Erdenet television station “on the 
fate of privatization vouchers for 9,000 employees of the Erdenet mining industry. After 
the television program, unknown people threatened Tsevegmid over the phone. The 
director of the Erdenest brokerage company, which held the vouchers, also warned the 
journalist, “It is a very complicated issue, you could be killed.” (http://www.ifex.org/
fr/content/view/full/75661/).
In 2005, an editor of a local newspaper was threatened on the phone after a critical 
article. Later on, unidentified people demolished her yard. The incident was reported to 
the police, but the police did not apprehend the perpetrators. The editor stressed that the 
newspaper has repeatedly received threats and been insulted by businessmen.
In several situations, the police have violated the journalists’ right to cover demon-
strations. In October 2006, two reporters were detained for 2 hours when they covered a 
civil society demonstration for two of the daily newspapers. One of the journalists was 
beaten by policemen, and her face and body were severely injured.
These alerts are the tip of the iceberg. Interviews with media professionals all over 
the country have proved, in accordance with the alerts reported to Globe International, 
that many of the interviewed journalists, editors, and people in civil society have been 
exposed to harassment. Many of them did not report the incidents to the police or to 
Globe International. In many cases, the perpetrators were part of the governing politi-
cal elite, powerful businessmen or even the police. Often the interviewees expressed 
distrust in the executive power of the police and the judicial power of the court. In fact, 
they feared that reporting harassment to the police would make things even worse, and 
they feared that further attention to and publicity on the incidents could easily spark 
more tension and animosity, especially in rural areas. 
These violations of media freedom cause great concern and make it extremely dif-
ficult for the Mongolian media to fulfill their role as watchdog and the fourth estate. 
Censorship is formally abolished, but self-censorship is prevalent. 
Political and Financial Pressure 
Political and financial pressure on the media occurs to a varying extent in any media 
system, no matter how hard journalists, media owners and politicians claim the oppo-
site, and investigative journalism will always encounter difficulties, because the core 
of investigative journalism is to disclose information that some people or institutions 
want to keep secret. However, in Mongolia, political and financial dependency is criti-
cal, because the pressure comes in many different forms and the malpractices are deeply 
rooted in the daily routines and generally accepted by journalists and editors. 
The Mongolian media are saturated with different forms of ‘paid for’ stories that are 
presented as independent reporting. The ‘paid for’ stories are prevalent even among the 
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most serious daily newspapers and the national television stations. Most media outlets 
and journalists fully accept making these kinds of stories paid for by companies, politi-
cians, NGO’s or whoever is willing to pay for publicity or setting the agenda. Usually 
the media outlet receives the money for the ‘paid for’ stories and the journalist receives 
a commission in addition to his or her normal salary. At the leading daily newspapers, 
first-year journalists receive a monthly salary of around US$ 50 to 60, while the salary 
can be doubled or tripled through procurement of ‘paid for’ stories. A popular and expe-
rienced journalist often makes around US$ 400 a month from ‘paid for’ stories alone. 
Just as with petty corruption, low salaries for journalists, as low as US$ 40-50 per 
month, are used as an excuse by many journalists who willingly choose to be part of 
the vicious cycle of accepting financial benefits for writing ‘paid for’ stories. However, 
the practice comes with a price tag: The ‘paid for’ reporting on social, economic, and 
political issues is rarely fair and unbiased, as many media outlets and journalists are 
willing to give up ethical standards to accommodate political and financial agendas for 
their own financial gain. The ‘paid for’ stories also make it difficult for the journalists 
to write critically about the same issue the next day, and sometimes journalists are paid 
for not writing about controversial issues. 
The local media are even more prone to accepting ‘paid for’ stories in order to make 
ends meet, because advertisement and subscriptions rarely provide sufficient revenue 
for the survival of local media. The majority of local media and journalists accept ‘paid 
for’ official news from the governor’s office and ‘paid for’ stories from politicians and 
businessmen, as they see little other choice owing to the lack of other viable revenue 
models. Hence there are few local media that scrutinize local government beyond the 
point of complaining about potholes in the pavement and broken light bulbs in street-
lights, and local media rarely investigate the local political and business establishment 
unless it is part of a partisan political agenda. The bottom line is that the media in many 
local communities are distorted, small-scale reflections of the national media.
In general, the complexity and severity of the violations of media freedom and the po-
litical and financial dependency are crucial. The media work in an extremely politicized 
environment with mistrust in the police and the court system, heavily vested political 
and financial interests, and lack of journalistic professionalism and ethical standards. In 
many ways, the Mongolian media situation reflects fundamental problems in Mongolian 
society – problems that can be ascribed to corruption, prevalent clientelism, the legacy 
of the Communist regime, and the lack of a democratic tradition. 
Having said this, it has to be stressed that there are significant developments pointing 
in the opposite direction. First of all, the totalitarian control of the media that existed 
during Communism has disappeared, and the plethora of media outlets has created 
pluralism. The daily and weekly political newspapers thrive on the newly gained free-
dom of expression and reflect different points of view. The fact that the newspapers are 
instrumental to political (and financial) interests is in line with a long publicist tradition 
and similar to the party press in Western countries in the early Twentieth Century. In 
this sense, it could be argued that the Mongolian media system as a whole fulfils the 
criteria for external pluralism in Hallin and Mancini’s definition: a “range of media 
outlets or organizations reflecting the points of view of different groups or tendencies 
in society” (Hallin and Mancini, 2004 p. 29). However, not all opinions are heard. Some 
opinions, critical of the political establishment, have been silenced through violations 
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of freedom of expression, and it is probably more problematic that huge disadvantaged 
groups (herders, migrants, and poor people in general) have limited access and ability 
to express themselves in the media and are generally excluded from the public sphere. 
The newspaper market is an exclusive domain, where the political and financial estab-
lishment exchange views and opinions among themselves.
Secondly, the electronic media, not least television, is another ball game. Television 
is the main source of news and information for the broader population. Thus, television 
news and political programming are the main battlefields, and the owners of dominant 
television stations unscrupulously exploit their dominant position in an attempt to control 
news coverage and political debates and to exclude oppositional views. Paradoxically, 
the American owned Eagle TV has played a key role in news coverage on television. 
Eagle TV has developed an all-news format9 based on Western journalistic standards 
and extensive live coverage. Eagle TV has in many ways set new standards for news 
coverage in Mongolia and challenged biased and politically controlled news on the 
other media outlets. Eagle TV’s ratings have improved continuously, and in 2006 the 
station was one of the leading providers of news to the Ulaanbaatar audience. At first, 
the competitors reacted within their traditional mindset by contesting the numbers, but 
this was obviously a short-lived strategy, because it did not address the problem of de-
creasing audiences and in the end of less political influence. Hence, viewers’ preferences 
for more fact-based and balanced news coverage have gradually spurred changes in the 
news coverage from the competitors. 
Interestingly, Eagle TV – similar to most media outlets in Mongolia – is instrumental 
to other interests. The station is not run as a media business in itself, but instead as a 
heavily subsidized missionary station strongly advocating the virtues of Western jour-
nalism and the free market, and secondarily preaching religious beliefs. Further, Eagle 
TV would probably have been squeezed out of the market in one way or another if it 
were not for extremely good connections to the American Embassy and even to political 
leaders in Washington. For (geo)political reasons, the Mongolian political elite has been 
forced to accept the challenge from Eagle TV. 
Finally, Western standards of free and independent media and professional journal-
ism are well-known in the Mongolian media community, because Western donors have 
provided comprehensive mid-career training programs often at the Press Institute of 
Mongolia, and several new journalism schools promote Western journalistic ideas. 
Despite all odds, many well-trained and skilful journalists have committed themselves 
to providing independent and fact-based journalism and sometimes even investigative 
journalism, and there are some media outlets committed to independent and balanced 
news, Eagle TV being the most prominent and influential example.
Public Broadcasting
In the following section, the focus will be shifted from private media to the establish-
ment of public broadcasting. In 2006, the former state-run broadcaster was transformed 
into a public broadcaster
Throughout the years, neither MPRP nor DP had been ready to give up control of 
state-run broadcasting during their time in power, because both parties considered the 
station to be instrumental for their political interests. Finally, 15 years after the transi-
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tion, the governing coalition gave in to political pressure from civil society and donors 
in 2005 and adopted a public broadcasting law modeled on Western standards, although 
a few key issues such as funding and political independence remained unresolved. The 
continuation of state-run broadcasting did not send the right signals of a successful 
ongoing democratization process.
Although MPRP and DP in the meantime had established well-subsidized private 
radio and television in Ulaanbaatar as well as the two parties controlled many local radio 
and television stations, it can be argued that the politicians only pretended to give in to 
the pressure to comply with demands for public broadcasting. The politicians have not 
yet been ready to give up control of public broadcasting, instead the regulatory body, 
the National Council, has been a political battlefield for indirect political influence. 
Consequently, the first General Director was fired after only a few months, because 
he did not serve the dominant political interests, and leadership at the helm of the new 
public broadcaster has changed repeatedly. Furthermore, the station has been estab-
lished without proper funding for programming, equipment upgrades, and obligations 
toward long-time employees. The lack of proper funding makes the public broadcaster 
vulnerable to external pressure and makes genuine changes extremely difficult. Obvi-
ously the political establishment is not fully committed to politically independent public 
broadcasting. 
Since the transformation in 2006, the public broadcaster has been in the midst of 
an extremely complex and dynamic transition process. While the station is undergoing 
internal institutional changes, it also has to adjust to new competitive environments 
for radio and television. The State-run broadcaster had a privileged position even after 
the political transition in 1990, because the national radio channel was and still is the 
only radio station with national coverage, and the television channel is the most widely 
distributed terrestrial channel, and since 2004 it has been distributed by satellite. 
The strong nationwide presence gives the public broadcaster a competitive advan-
tage as the main source of information for the rural population, and therefore the public 
broadcaster is still a key political player. But this national advantage comes with a 
built-in disadvantage, especially in relation to television. The new booming television 
market in the capital is creating dramatic changes in the pattern of television viewing, 
and the public broadcaster has to develop a strategy to address the needs of the increas-
ingly modern viewers in the capital, and at the same time cater to the needs of the more 
homogeneous and less modern rural population. It is a tremendous challenge to establish 
a successful strategy, within the public broadcasting obligations, that can bridge this 
gap. So far, the public broadcaster has not presented proper strategies to address these 
challenges. 
For better and worse, the public broadcaster has inherited the old (Communist) state-
run institution in terms of its buildings, outdated equipment, most of its management, 
and all the aging employees, but worst of all the public broadcaster is caught in a web 
of firmly established expectations related to the past – expectations held by viewers and 
politicians alike. Thus far, the broadcaster has not been able to reform itself from within, 
the transition has only resulted in minor changes, and public broadcasting has not estab-
lished itself as a substantial socially responsible supplement to the private media. 
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Conclusion
The constitutional rights to freedom of expression and freedom of the press have es-
tablished the foundation for free and independent media in Mongolia, and societal 
and technological developments have resulted in dramatic changes in the Mongolian 
media landscape, with an impressive increase in media outlets and external pluralism. 
However, the Mongolian media as an institution have far to go to live up to the ideals 
of liberal media theory. 
From a theoretical point of view, it can be argued that the main problems in the 
Mongolian media are related to a paradox in liberal media theory between indispensa-
ble individual rights to freedom of expression and normative expectations on the press 
as a whole. Freedom of the press is mainly an individual right all media outlets have, 
but the relation between the sum of all the individual rights and the press as a whole 
remains unresolved. Liberal media theory’s strong confidence in market forces as the 
main regulating mechanism has proved to be seriously wrong in Mongolia, as is the case 
in many minor transition countries such as Albania, Montenegro and Slovakia (Petkovic 
2004). This is partly due to the fact that the media are not only a commodity like other 
commodities, the media have a privileged position, such that their political and financial 
influence in some cases suspends market forces and leaves the field open for stronger 
political, financial, and cultural forces in society.
Liberal media theory has fundamentally been elaborated in relation to Western media, 
where the media systems have gone through long evolutionary historic processes, and 
where the media have been continuously, and still are, under public scrutiny and are regu-
lated in different ways (anti-trust laws, restrictions on cross-ownership, self-regulatory 
bodies, code of ethics, etc.). Despite these modifying regulations, Western liberal media 
systems very often expose their serious shortcomings, also regarding fair and independent 
competition, pluralism and the quality of the press. Hence, it is problematic, some might 
say naive, to expect that in a revolutionary transition process the media will by default 
adopt a system of free and independent media supporting genuine democratization proc-
esses; the media may just as well turn into a monster and obstruct democratization. 
The media will always be a battlefield for legitimate as well as illegitimate political 
and financial interests, but from a Western democratic point of view, it is impossible to 
accept limitations on freedom of the press. Freedom of expression is an indispensable 
necessity in democratic processes. On the other hand, in ‘free’ media systems it is impor-
tant to build in checks and balances, some of which should be incorporated into media 
legislation (anti-trust laws, limitations on cross-ownership, and freedom of information), 
some of which should be self-regulatory bodies on codes of ethics, etc., while others 
should be a strong support to independent national and international civil society groups 
that can guide and support the media and act as watchdogs for violations of media free-
dom and misconduct in the media. Further, public broadcasting and community media 
with socially responsible remits can be very strong assets in establishing the media as 
the Forth Estate in a well functioning free and independent media system. However, in 
Mongolia as in most transition countries, the transformation of state-run broadcasting 
into public broadcasting has been marred with problems, and the public broadcaster has 
not been able to break away from the past and set an alternative agenda. 
Liberal media theory focuses on the media’s role of monitoring the state, but in Mon-
golia the media do not fulfill this role, because the private media are largely an integrated 
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part of an unholy alliance between the state and the business sector, hence the media 
have no interest in exposing state misconduct or in exposing wrongdoings in the private 
sector. As a consequence, the media appear to be more like a lapdog than a watchdog. In 
the politicized media environment, the media sometimes look like snarling Rottweilers 
in the service of specific political and financial interests, but from an overall perspective, 
the media act as a lapdog in the service of the political and financial establishment. The 
lapdog is trained with sticks and carrots, the sticks being violation of media freedom 
and harassment, and the carrots being the benefits offered for loyalty.
In many ways, the media in the current situation reflect Mongolian society in general. 
The overall political and financial power structure in the society is mirrored in media 
ownership and control of the media. The defective separation of powers has a serious 
impact on the media, because violations of media freedom are rarely taken seriously by 
the police and the court system, this lack of protection quells journalists’ urge to engage 
in investigative and critical reporting that discloses serious wrongdoings. The cultural 
acceptance of petty corruption and clientelism is mirrored in the ‘paid for’ stories in the 
media. This is not to argue that a simple causal relationship exists between media and 
society, the situation is much more complex and ambivalent than that. The media have 
freedom of action and opportunities for development. In some situations, like the impact 
of Eagle TV, the developments are unpredictable, while in others, like the transformation 
of state-run broadcasting, they are foreseeable, but the media do not function separate 
from the rest of society.
Notes
 1. The present article is based on a comprehensive UNESCO media sector analysis of the Mongolian media 
landscape (Ziyasheva, Redl, and Nielsen 2007), systematic monitoring of the Mongolian media land-
scape since 1999 carried out by the Press Institute of Mongolia, and on several research and consultancy 
projects in Mongolia since 1999.
 2. For a more elaborated analysis of the transition phase, see Myagmar and Nielsen 2001.
 3. Mongolia is divided into 21 aimags (provinces) and 336 soums. Each aimag has an administrative center 
(town), and the soum centers are usually villages. The mining cities Erdenet and Darkhan with 70,000-
80,000 inhabitants are more urbanized and modern than the other towns in the provinces.
 4. Source: Mongolian Media Monitoring 2006.
 5. Since 2004, the public broadcaster and four Ulaanbaatar-based stations have been distributed by satellite 
and rebroadcast locally by the local authorities in towns and a few villages.
 6. The CAT� systems offer up to 50 Mongolian and foreign channels. According to fi gures from Monitor-
ing Mongolian Media 2005, cable penetration in the capital exceeds 50%. The high cable penetration is 
partly due to availability in the many apartment blocks.
 7. The current legislation on media issues has some shortcomings in relation to access to information and 
defamation. The state secrecy law allows comprehensive secrecy classifications to be applied to govern-
ment records. Government officials at all levels make frequent use of these restrictions to keep informa-
tion secret. Contrary to international standards, the criminal law does have provisions on defamation.
 8. All of the alerts are available in Mongolian at http://www.monitoring.mn and 12 of the alerts have been 
reported to IFEX available at http://www.ifex.org. The first annual report from the project is available 
at: www.globeinter.org.mn.
 9. The news programs are supplemented by a few strategically placed Christian programs.
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